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Guy Claxton and Paul R. SparrowRecent advances in social cognitive neuroscience and related fields have rejuvenated
scholarly research into intuition. This article considers the implications of these develop-
ments for understanding managerial and organizational decision making. Over the past
two decades, researchers have made considerable progress in distinguishing intuition from
closely-related constructs such as instinct and insight and the interplay between these
non-conscious forms of cognition and explicit reasoning processes is now better under-
stood. In the wake of significant theoretical and methodological convergence centred on
dual-process theories of reasoning, judgment and social cognition, supported by func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, several of the foundational assumptions
underpinning classic theories and frameworks in strategic management and entrepre-
neurship research are being called into question. Old models based on a simplistic left
brain/right brain dichotomy are giving way to more sophisticated conceptions, in which
intuitive and analytical approaches to decision making are underpinned by complex
neuropsychological systems. In the light of these advances, the authors offer their re-
flections on what this all means for the assessment, development and management of
intuition in the workplace.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Until comparatively recently, only the bravest and most farsighted of individuals would acknowl-
edge the utility of intuition in business management. For example, several decades ago, one of the
founders of Raychem claimed that the decisions he regretted were the ones not based on intuition.
At Genentech, one of the world’s leading biotechnology companies, CEO Arthur Levinson has said
that ‘‘as a manager it often comes down to intuition. Is it going to work or not?’’ Indeed, Genentech0024-6301/$ - see front matter  2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2009.05.003
is a company in which scientists are encouraged to act on promising leads, follow their intuition
and test hypotheses d a recipe that enables ‘‘great science’’ rather than mere ‘‘formula’’. The
co-founder of Sony, Akio Moriata, and the driving force behind one of the entertainment innova-
tions of the 20th century, the Sony Walkman, stated that ‘‘creativity requires something more than
the processing of information. It requires human thought, spontaneous intuition and a lot of cour-
age’’.1 Notwithstanding these and many other examples of the power of intuition in judgment and
strategic decision making, managers in general (particularly those at lower levels) are often averse to
admitting to its usefulness. Perhaps one reason for this reluctance is because, historically, intuition
has been viewed as a vague and irrational notion; however, scientific progress over the past two de-
cades has: (1) clarified the nature of intuition, bringing much-needed conceptual precision to bear
in order to differentiate it from a number of related concepts; (2) identified the psychological pro-
cesses and neurobiological mechanisms underpinning its operation and use; (3) illuminated the cir-
cumstances in which it is deployed effectively, and; (4) proposed relatively robust methods by
which it may be assessed and developed. Reviewing these advances in the context of the dramatic
changes that have occurred in the modern workplace, in this article we argue that informed intu-
ition is as essential to the competence portfolio of hard-pressed decision makers as many of the
analytical skills that feature in contemporary business school curricula.2The information processing challenges of the modern workplace
Complexity and dynamism in hypercompetitive business environments allied to new organizational
structures and work practices are placing unprecedented demands on the information processing ca-
pacities of individuals and groups. These problems are further compounded by technological advances
that have resulted in a surfeit of information that managers are required to sort, interpret, prioritise and
act on.3 Given the nature of these demands and the limited timeframes within which decisions are typ-
ically made, it is of little surprise that managers’ information processing capacities are often exceeded
and that they behave in ways that aspire to be rational but are so only within cognitively-circumscribed
limits. The conventional model of bounded rationality espoused by Herbert Simon, resonating with the
earlier writings of Chester Barnard in the 1930s on the role of non-logical processes in management, not
only acknowledged the computational limits of decision makers, but also acceded to a potential role for
non-cognitive processes, such as affect, and, in particular, intuition.4
Notwithstanding their profundity and impact over several decades, the insights offered by Simon
and Barnard do not accord with current understanding of the interplay of intuition and analysis in
organizational decision processes, informed by the latest advances in cognitive and social psychol-
ogy and the emerging field of social cognitive neuroscience. Reflecting the fact that intuition oper-
ates at the nexus of thinking and feeling, contemporary dual-process theories of judgment and
decision making are uniquely placed to account for the ways in which strategists are able to
meet the information processing demands of the modern workplace, which are daunting to say
the least. Against this backdrop, the notion of strategic competence, defined as the ability of organi-
zation members to acquire, store, recall, interpret and act on information that is relevant to the
survival and wellbeing of the organization, is vitally important.5
In our view, intuitive judgment is an indispensable component of strategic competence. Accord-
ingly, improved knowledge of the factors that promote the successful deployment of intuition might
be used not only to select, train, appraise and reward individuals, but also to configure strategy teams
in ways that leverage the capability of organizations to become more cognitively skilled, thus enhanc-
ing their capacity for learning and renewal. To this end, in later sections of this article we suggest that
the development of managers’ intuition in the workplace can be leveraged by developing individuals’
expertise, self-awareness and reflexivity. Furthermore, as strategic competence is a collective activity,
we consider the implications of our analysis for managing and leading teams, such that a requisite
blend of individual cognitive competencies (both intuitive and analytical) and the development of
shared understandings of intuitions (which are inherently subjective and experiential) might be
achieved. We begin by providing a background review of current knowledge of intuition from the278 Intuition in Organizations
fields of cognitive and social psychology, social cognitive neuroscience and decision research before
offering a number of arguments concerning the strategic applications of intuition.What is intuition?
In recent decades, the possibility that much of human thought, including a number of higher-level
cognitive operations, is non-conscious has become a centrally important precept of modern cogni-
tive science.6 Reasoning is seen no longer as an exclusively conscious or deliberative process. Rather,
consciousness, as well as being, figuratively speaking, the ‘‘workshop’’ of the mind, is also the ‘‘con-
trol panel’’ upon which signals from the ‘‘interior’’ appear to offer potential guidance for individual
judgment and decision making. One such signal, intuition, is an important faculty of the so-called
‘‘intelligent-unconscious’’. It is a judgment for a given course of action that comes to mind with an
aura or conviction of rightness or plausibility, but without clearly articulated reasons or justifica-
tions e essentially ‘‘knowing’’ but without knowing why.7Reasoning is seen no longer as an exclusively conscious or deliberative
processIntuition is not the same as instinct; nor is it equivalent to insight. Unfortunately, however,
a number of authors and managers conflate these concepts.8 Although popular management writers
frequently adopt the terms ‘‘business instinct’’ and ‘‘intuitive insight’’, it is important to note that
from a psychological standpoint, instinct pertains merely to hardwired, autonomous reflex actions,
for example a ‘‘knee-jerk’’, or the behaviour patterns of certain animals (such as the homing in-
stinct in birds). Insight, on the other hand, is a sudden and unexpected solution to a problem, ar-
rived at after an impasse has been reached and an incubation period has elapsed. The point at which
the solution occurs is sometimes referred to as a ‘‘eureka’’ moment and is a prominent feature of
many tales of important scientific discoveries, including those of Archimedes, Newton, Kekule´ and
Poincare´. An incubation period is often necessary for insight to occur because it enables non-con-
scious processes to operate more freely by relaxing constraints imposed by rational analysis. An in-
tuition of a solution may presage the insightful moment, in other words: intuitions are intimations
of insights experienced as ‘‘feeling of knowing’’ or ‘‘tip of the tongue’’ phenomena. Such intima-
tions have been reported in the accounts of a number of Nobel Prize-winning scientists, who in-
terpreted them as signposts on the route to major scientific discoveries.9 The neural process of
‘‘spreading activation’’ among nodes in long-term memory (again, operating beneath the level of
conscious awareness) enables the production of associations and novel and unexpected connections
among concepts, and this is one of the hallmarks of creativity.10 The subtle distinctions between
insight and intuition are beginning to be mapped by cognitive neuroscientists using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques. For example, one study identified the anterior
superior temporal gyrus (aSTG) region of the right hemisphere of the brain as a location of the
connections that occur at the moment of insight. Other, more recent, work has identified the or-
bito-frontal cortex (OFC) and the amygdala to be activated in intuitive judgments, both of which
are regions also involved in emotionally-driven decisions.11 It is important to note that neither in-
sight nor intuition occur in a cognitive vacuum or in an ‘‘unprepared mind’’; rather, learning and
experience constitute the substances on which such associative processes operate. Insight, the ability
to see into and articulate the structure of a problem, is thus as important as intuition in the rep-
ertoire of cognitively-skilled strategists. The challenge for managers, leaders and organizations is to
create the enabling conditions for both of these processes to flourish.
For many years, intuition research was dogged by problems of weak conceptualization, mani-
fested in multiple and sometimes conflicting definitions, emanating from fields as disparate asLong Range Planning, vol 42 2009 279
Jungian psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology. These definitional issues d to a certain extent
manifestations of healthy disparitiesd can never be totally resolved; for example a behavioural de-
cision researcher within the heuristics and biases tradition is unlikely to define intuition in the same
way as a social cognitive neuroscientist. However, in management at least, there appears to be
a growing consensus that intuition comprises the following:
(1) a capacity for attaining direct knowledge or understanding without the apparent intrusion of
rational thought or logical inference;
(2) neither the opposite of rationality, nor a random process of guessing, intuition corresponds to
thoughts, conclusions and choices produced largely or in part through non-conscious mental
processes;
(3) affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid, non-conscious and holistic
associations.12
Insights and intuitions are related only in so far as an intuition may precede an insight as a
‘‘feeling of knowing’’, or an intimation of a potential problem solution. However, not all intuitions
become insights; many remain as unconfirmed hypotheses or judgments, while some become the
subject of empirical verification or refutation.13 Moreover, the affective charge that is an outcome
of the intuitive process is distinct from emotions per se.
Insights from dual-process formulations
Cognitive scientists are increasingly in agreement that humans process information by means of
two systems, which may be grouped together under the umbrella notion of System 1 and System
2 information processing architecture.14 In evolutionary terms, System 1 processes are older;
they operate largely beyond conscious awareness on an automatic basis. As such, they require min-
imal cognitive resources. System 2 processes, in contrast, emerged comparatively recently in Homo
sapiens’ evolution and require effortful attention, thus placing a premium on the brain’s limited
processing capacities. As noted earlier, dual-process accounts of judgment and decision making,
in our view, offer a compelling psychological explanation for the interplay of intuition and analysis
in managerial thought and action. Of the multiplicity of dual-process theories within the cognitive
and social psychology literatures, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST), developed by the so-
cial psychologist Seymour Epstein and his colleagues, is the most apposite for basing our discussion
of intuition in the strategic management process.15 As shown in Exhibit 1, CEST is a global theory
of personality that integrates the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious, based on two in-
teractive modes of information processing.
Dual-process theories such as CEST provide a broad conceptual framework within which the con-
struct of intuition can be located conveniently alongside more conventional approaches. Such theo-
ries do not seek to offer explanations of the underlying mechanisms that enable certain individuals to
form intuitive judgments and incorporate them within their wider decision-making repertoire. For-
tunately, however, recent advances in two seemingly unrelated fields of study, cognitive/social cogni-
tive neuroscience and naturalistic decision making (NDM), provide key insights in this regard.Insights from cognitive and social cognitive neuroscience
Recent advances in cognitive and social cognitive neuroscience have displaced the notion that in-
dividuals are marked by an overwhelming preference for analytical or intuitive approaches to infor-
mation processing, a tendency historically attributed to gross hemispheric specialization.17 Known
as the lateralisation hypothesis, this outmoded view, still adhered to by a number of contemporary
writers on managerial decision making, was first popularised in the 1970s by Henry Mintzberg.18
Mintzberg and other management writers at that time used contemporary insights of neuropsychol-
ogy to powerful effect, arguing that formal business planning relied on the left hemisphere’s sequen-
tial-logical processes, whereas the less formal, intuitive aspects of management were accomplished
by the right hemisphere of the cerebral cortex, as depicted in Exhibit 2.280 Intuition in Organizations
Exhibit 1: System 1/System 2 Processes and Cognitive Experiential Self-
Theory
Generic descriptions and examples
System 1 System 2 Sources16
Associative; holistic; automatic;
undemanding of cognitive capacity;
relatively fast operation; acquisition
by biology, exposure and personal
experience
Rule-based; analytic; controlled;
demanding of cognitive capacity;
relatively slow operation; acquisition





Epstein’s cognitive experiential self-theory
Experiential system Rational system Sources16
Holistic; automatic, effortless; affective;
associationistic; mediated by ‘vibes’
from past events; concrete images,
metaphors, narratives; more rapid,
immediate action; slower more
resistant to change; changes with
repetitive/intense experience
Analytic; intentional, effortful; logical;
mediated by conscious appraisal
of events; abstract symbols, words,
numbers; slower, delayed action;
changes more rapidly; changes
with strength of argument,
new evidence
Epstein (1994, 2008)
Epstein et al (1996)
Exhibit 2
Hemispheric Specialization and Human Information Processing in Management Decision
Making, based on the now outmoded lateralization of function hypothesis. (Source: W.
Taggart and D. Robey, 1981, Minds and Managers: On the dual nature of human informa-
tion processing and management. Academy of Management Review, 6(2), p. 187e195).
1981 by The AcademyofManagement. Reproduced by kind permission of the publisher.
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Reflecting various advances in cognitive neuroscience that have occurred over the years, some
writers in management have suggested more recently that the notion of hemispheric specialization
is now better thought of as a convenient metaphor for two modes of processing, rather than a literal
representation of the neural substrates of intuition and analysis.19 However, in the light of the very
latest developments in social cognitive neuroscience and related fields (see Exhibit 3), in our view
talk of gross left brain/right brain differences in information processing is perhaps best avoided
altogether.20
One other body of recent evidence from the field of cognitive neuroscience is also worthy of
mention. As discussed in Exhibit 4, in a series of seminal studies, the clinical neurologist Antonio
Damasio and his colleagues compared the performance of normal participants and patients with
damage to the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), a brain region implicated in the induction
of emotions, on a high-risk gambling task known as the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). This work led
Damasio and his colleagues to advance the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH), according to which
the autonomic gut feeling response experienced by the normal participants has the potential to
guide decision making advantageously and they typically err on the side of caution (although
gut feeling can have a negative as well as positive valence). An implication of these findings is
that once the neural mechanisms underpinning so-called ‘‘gut feelings’’ are compromised by injury
or disease, the consequential absence of the somatic (bodily) signal can be potentially dysfunctional
across a variety of decision-making situations.Exhibit 3
Hypothesized neural correlates of the C-system supporting reflective social cognition
(analogous to controlled processing) and the X-system supporting reflexive social cogni-
tion (analogous to automatic processing) displayed on a canonical brain rendering from
(A) lateral, (B) ventral, and (C) medial views. Note: the basal ganglia and amygdala are sub-
cortical structures that are displayed here on the cortical surface for ease of presentation.
(Source: M.D. Lieberman, 2007, Social Cognitive Neuroscience: A Review of Core Pro-
cesses. Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 58, p. 259e289) Copyright2007 by Annual Re-
views. All Rights Reserved. Reproduced by kind permission of the publisher
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Exhibit 4
The Iowa Gambling Task
In the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) studies, participants chose from four decks of cards; two
were rigged to give a modest long-term monetary gain (the ‘‘good’’ decks), while the other
two (the ‘‘bad’’ decks) were rigged to give some high gains but even higher losses, culminat-
ing in an inevitable long-term loss. Normal participants (i.e. ones without damage to the
VMPC) developed a ‘‘hunch’’ for choosing advantageously from the good decks before
they were consciously aware which strategy worked best. Moreover, they generated anticipa-
tory skin conductance responses (SCRs) not only before they became consciously aware of
the strategy they were adopting, but also before they exercised a risky choice. VMPC-dam-
aged participants, in contrast, gravitated towards the risky, bad decks. Not only did this group
continue to choose disadvantageously even after they realised that the correct strategy was
to choose from the good decks, they also failed to demonstrate any anticipatory SCRsd fig-
uratively speaking they lacked any ‘‘gut feeling’’ to steer their decisions away from the inev-
itable monetary loss.21Insights from naturalistic decision making
The view of ‘‘intuition-as-feeling’’ is complemented by the view of ‘‘intuition-as-expertise’’. In
1987, Herbert Simon described intuitions as analyses frozen into habit and the capacity for rapid
response through recognition. Informed, as opposed to na€ıve, intuitions are ‘‘compressed’’ analyses,
executed by decision makers on the basis of perception, recognition and awareness built on learn-
ing, experience and feedback and supported by repertoires of action scripts that enable a decision
maker to ‘‘do what normally works’’ without decompressing their expertise. Much of the evidence
in support of Simon’s arguments can now be found in developments in naturalistic decision-mak-
ing (NDM) research as well as the neuroscience research discussed in the previous section.
NDM researchers examine the ways in which experts take complex, high-stakes, ill-structured de-
cisions under conditions of time pressure, where the opportunity to engage in deliberative, rea-
soned analysis is severely constrained (for example firefighters faced with the decision of whether
or not to evacuate a burning building). The Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) model developed
by NDM researcher Gary Klein and his colleagues has shown that domain experts such as fire-
fighters and nurses typically identify a single course of action and follow it through without gen-
erating and evaluating multiple alternatives (in a variant of the RPD model, the decision maker
may accept or reject a course of action on the basis of a forward projection via mental simulation).
As a result of accumulated expertise, domain experts develop complex, domain-relevant mental
representations (known as schemas) and associated action scripts, which afford them not only
a highly-tuned awareness of the situation, but also the capability to pattern match, in order to sense
when something is ‘‘out-of-kilter’’ and intuitively know what actions to perform. In addition to the
recognition aspect of intuitive judgment (in the words of Simon ‘‘analyses frozen into habit’’), the
RPD model affords a role for affect in its explanation of the decision making process. In a number
of Klein’s more revealing case studies, the decision maker’s contextual awareness resulted in a par-
ticular combination of cues of not ‘‘feeling’’ right, a sense that varied in intensity from unease to
anxiety to outright alarm, leading in turn to decisive action taking, with little or no justification
beyond these basic affective signals.22
In sum, the conjoining of the SMH with the RPD model under the umbrella of dual-process the-
ory provides an integrative and workable account of intuitive decision making for management re-
searchers. Having clarified the nature of intuition and identified the psychological processes
underpinning its operation, in the following sections we consider theory and research that has,
over a number of decades, investigated how and when managers use intuition. Our aim is to presentLong Range Planning, vol 42 2009 283
Exhibit 5
Sample selection of studies of how managers use intuition
Managerial use of intuition Method Source25
Sense when a problem exists
Perform well-learned behaviour patterns
rapidly
Synthesize isolated bits of data and experience
into an integrated picture
Check on the results of more rational analysis
Bypass indepth analysis and more rapidly




Varies with job level (senior managers are more
intuitive than middle or lower-level managers)
Should be used to help guide strategic decisions,
but is one tool of many to use in guiding decisions
High level of uncertainty and there is little
previous precedent
Variables are unpredictable, and facts are limited
and clearly don’t point the way to go
Several plausible alternative solutions exist




Most relevant in: corporate strategy and planning;
human resource development; marketing; research
and development; public relations; investment
and diversification; acquisitions, mergers and alliances
Least relevant in: operations and production




Personnel or people-related decisions
When decisions need to be made quickly
or unexpectedly
When uncertainty pervades in novel situations
Situations lacking specific cues






Going beyond rational data and information
Using experiences to cut through to the essence
of a situation, make sense of it and test its validity




Note: For Parikh (1994) ‘most relevant’ are those uses cited by more than 50 per cent of respondents, listed in de-
scending order of importance; vice versa for ‘least relevant’.a balanced account, highlighting both the potential benefits of its skilful deployment and its pitfalls
when used indiscriminately, on an uninformed basis.Managerial use and effectiveness of intuition
In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of business researchers explored how managers perceive intuition
and how they use it across a variety of business contexts.23 Exhibit 5 summarizes the findings of284 Intuition in Organizations
these studies. A likely precondition for successful intuitive judgment is that the decision maker has
domain-relevant expertise and is thus able to exercise informed, as opposed to na€ıve, intuition and
the use of intuition is favoured by managers where the problem is loosely structured, i.e. there is no
objective criterion for success (such as in political, ethical, moral or aesthetic judgments) or any
pre-conceived solution, and where the decision process needs to be expedited.24
The heuristics and biases programme of research instigated by Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky countered the rational actor model by demonstrating that in people’s everyday judgments,
their rapid and automatic ‘‘natural assessments’’, are likely to depart from the laws of logic and
probability. In consequence, Kahneman and Tversky and behavioural decision researchers more
generally maintained that decision makers are often prone to errors and bias.26 The vignettes
used in heuristics and biases research are designed in such a way as to reveal the errors that accrue
from intuitive judgments in which the laws of probability and statistics are flouted. However, in-
tuition as an adaptive process is ill-suited to such problems, which, unlike the complex problems
that confront real-world decision makers, are artificially constrained to meet the requirements of
laboratory experimentation. As a result, several more recent developments have led a growing num-
ber of researchers to revise the rather downbeat view of intuitive judgment that pervades behaviou-
ral decision theory. As well as exploring when and how managers and decision makers deploy
intuition, this new breed of organizational decision research has examined the effectiveness of in-
tuitive judgment in business.
In a range of studies, intuitive judgment has been found to be associated positively not only with
the quality and speed of decisions, but also the financial and non-financial performance of the
wider organization,27 while in the context of business venturing, the use of intuition has been found
to be higher among entrepreneurs than ordinary managers. Intuitive judgment has also been dem-
onstrated to be related to entrepreneurs’ growth intentions and is an important influence during
the idea generation stage in new product development.28Intuitive judgment has also been demonstrated to be related to
entrepreneurs’ growth intentionsFurther benefits arising from the skilful deployment of intuition are exemplified by the case stud-
ies recounted by Gary Klein and his colleagues in the context of RPD, in situations as diverse as
neonatal care and firefighting.29 The psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer and his colleagues have demon-
strated a number of ways in which decision makers are able to deal successfully with complexity
through the adoption of heuristics (i.e. rules of thumb) that are adaptively matched to the structure
of the environment. In marked contrast with the rather pessimistic picture of the human mind
struggling to overcome computational limitations when faced with risk and uncertainty portrayed
by conventional behavioural decision researchers and cognitive scientists, NDM research and the
work of Gigerenzer and colleagues present more upbeat accounts of the role of heuristics and in-
tuition as bases for effective decision making. Like intuition, the ‘‘fast-and-frugal heuristics’’ iden-
tified by Gigerenzer and his colleagues evolved as part of the adaptive toolbox of the human mind
to support effective decision making under time pressure and in the absence of complete
information.30
Yet a further notion that emphasises the fact that authentic intuition is anything but primitive is
Leonard and Swap’s notion of ‘‘deep smarts’’, predicated upon an expertise-based view of intuition,
in which informed intuitive judgments arise from decision makers’ complex, domain-relevant men-
tal representations of the problem. According to Leonard and Swap, deep smarts enable decision
makers to quickly comprehend complex, interactive situations by using tacitly-held expertiseLong Range Planning, vol 42 2009 285
acquired from ‘‘first-hand life experiences’’. Leonard and Swap argue that deep smarts have been
observed in many work situations, ranging from the foresighted strategic planning decisions in
the Intuit Corporation to the opportunity recognition skills exercised by the multi-millionaire ven-
ture capitalist Vinod Kohsla to the difficult-to-articulate best practices embedded in the Toyota
Production System.31
In summing up each of the developments reviewed in this section, it is clear that each strand of
work points to a rather more upbeat account of intuition than has been historically portrayed by
behavioural decision researchers, based on a laboratory analysis of what in comparison are lower-
level heuristics (cognitive shortcuts) that unintentionally flout the laws of probabilistic logic and
consequently result in systematic errors of judgment. Contemporary understanding of intuition
and the use of heuristics in the workplace is rapidly moving away from such a limited account
of human reasoning and judgment. In essence, the type of intuitions in the everyday contexts of
business enterprises that form the central focus of this article d that is, affectively-charged judg-
ments based on experts’ complex domain relevant schemas d are not equivalent to the subject
matter of concern to most conventional behavioural decision researchers. However, although the
newer conceptual developments we have outlined show promise, it would be highly disingenuous
not to point out that this body of work has yet to be validated with the degree of rigour that has
become the hallmark of mainstream behavioural decision research.32 Nevertheless, sufficient prog-
ress has been achieved that the time has now come to offer a more balanced assessment than the
rather extreme positions adopted by many management and behavioural decision researchers.
Responding to a need for a critical evaluation of some of the ‘‘hype’’ that surrounded intuition,
especially in the popular management press, Miller and Ireland concluded that intuition can be
a troublesome decision tool with benefits that are far from unequivocal. In pursuit of this argu-
ment, they defined intuition in two ways. Intuition as ‘‘holistic hunch’’ is based on the creative syn-
thesis of diverse information and experiences; an example is Chrysler’s decision, or more correctly,
that of its CEO at the time, Jack Welch (of ‘‘managing straight from the gut’’ fame), to develop
a very different type of car in the form of the Dodge Viper. Intuition as automated expertise, on
the other hand, is essentially a recognition-primed ‘‘replay’’ of steps borne of past learning based
on a feeling of familiarity, as in the case of Chevy Chase Bank’s routine commercial loan decisions
for existing large customers. Miller and Ireland came to the view that holistic hunch intuition is
beneficial but only when companies are in an exploration phase (for example when seeking new
technologies and strategies), while automated expertise intuition yields disappointing outcomes
in exploratory behaviour but may also yield unpredictable outcomes in situations calling for the
straightforward use of past learning. Miller and Ireland suggested that the troublesome nature of
automated (tacit) intuitive judgment may be addressed by raising the decision process to an explicit
level through techniques such as devil’s advocacy or balancing intuitive judgment with formal an-
alytical tools (such as multi-attribute decision analysis and root cause analysis).33Implications for the assessment, development and management of intuition
in the workplace
In this final section, we consider a number of strategies to optimise information processing capa-
bilities at the individual and group levels, with a view to leveraging the benefits of intuition in the
enhancement of strategic competence. In line with dual-process conceptions of judgment and de-
cision making, skilled strategic decision making requires the blending of intuitive and analytic ap-
proaches to information processing in ways that enable the decision-making unit, whether an
individual, group or multiple groups, to appreciate important details, while also maintaining a big-
ger picture.34 How then might organizations best equip their strategists with the ability to switch
between analytical and intuitive processing so as to make more intelligent use of their intuitions?
To what extent is it possible to develop this switching capability in individuals? Or is this
a trait-based capability, thus implying a role for personnel selection so as to optimize the config-
uration of decision-making groups?286 Intuition in Organizations
Acquiring intuitive expertise
Studies of expert performance suggest that it can be enhanced considerably through intense prac-
tice, critical self-appraisal and candid feedback. For example, research into the role of expertise in
chess has indicated that chess Masters are capable of recognising and acting on as many as 50,000
meaningful patterns, acquired over at least 10 years and approximately 10,000 hours of study and
practice.35 As noted earlier, intuitive expertise enables decision makers to frame problems rapidly
and identify the appropriate course of action long before they are able to articulate their reasoning
as to why that course of action is appropriate. However, this rapidity of execution is far from the
‘‘innate genius’’ type of action often attributed to prodigies such as Mozart; rather, it is the product
of intensive learning, practice and feedback. Mintzberg’s recently published critique of mainstream
management development and management education programmes bears out this analysis.36 Ac-
cording to Mintzberg, conventional management development programmes, as taught in main-
stream business schools, have overly privileged conceptual knowledge at the expense of expertise
borne out of experience. Skilled management practice is, he says, as much ‘‘art’’ based on insight,
vision and intuition, as it is science.
The development of expertise and the concomitant capacity for intuition is an arduous journey; it
is not attained merely through the successful completion of a formal management qualification and/
or limited on the job experience; on the contrary, it requires a blending of conceptual/analytical
knowledge, probably best gained in the classroom, with experiential knowledge, gained through years
of exposure to challenging problems in the workplace. In other words, formal management education
needs to be allied to a programme of ongoing professional development. Deliberate practice, accom-
panied by candid but constructive, feedback is the order of the day. K. Anders Ericsson, the expertise
researcher, and his colleagues have shown that the deliberate practice that builds genuine expertise
requires both depth and breadth of engagement; hence, managers should not focus solely on improv-
ing the skills they already possess, which merely enables the development of the habitual responses
needed to deal with common or familiar problems. Rather, they also need to move outside their com-
fort zones to extend their strategic competence profiles, thereby equipping themselves with the skills
to deal with less common problems.37 Feedback is critically important in this process, but it is not
merely the fact that feedback is invited, given or received that is important; instead, the type and qual-
ity of feedback and the learning that results from it are also vitally important. Robin Hogarth, deci-
sion researcher, distinguishes between two types of learning environment: those that have ‘‘kind
learning structures’’ enhance intuition by affording effective feedback; ‘‘wicked structures for learn-
ing’’, in contrast, are contexts that suppress intuition. In other words, they lead to the development of
poor intuitive judgment by affording only limited, low-quality feedback, as for example when a CEO’s
intuitions go routinely unchallenged.38 Ultimately, it is the combination of focused and deliberate
conceptual and experiential development in a feedback-rich environment that makes for an appro-
priately rounded manager, i.e. one capable of authentic reflexivity.Formal management education needs to be allied to a vigorous
programme of ongoing professional developmentDeveloping self-awareness
Individual differences theorists distinguish between cognitive styles and cognitive strategies. The for-
mer refers to enduring overarching preferences in approach to the processing of information,
whereas the latter are approaches adopted in response to particular circumstantial demands.39 Pro-
viding managers with feedback on their preferred approach (i.e. their cognitive style) to information
processing is an important prerequisite for enabling them to explore, develop and ultimately deployLong Range Planning, vol 42 2009 287
alternative approaches (i.e. cognitive strategies) in situations where their preferred ways of thinking
are inappropriate and/or difficult to execute. In order to acquire such meta-cognitive skills, strategic
decision makers must first be made aware of their cognitive style through psychometric profiling, and
in so doing, they may become more reflective in their own practices. Fortunately, there are a growing
number of robust psychometric instruments that are easy to administer in workplace settings for the
purposes of personnel selection, assessment and development, the design of which are in keeping
with current dual-process theories of judgment and decision-making.40,41
A 2 2 typology based on a contemporary dual-process conceptualization of cognitive styles and
strategies was suggested by Hodgkinson and Clarke.42 As shown in Exhibit 6, ‘‘detail conscious indi-
viduals’’ are highly analytic with little regard for intuition. As a consequence, they are prone to becom-
ing overburdened by the demands of the situation, unable to extract the bigger picture, particularly
when operating under time pressure. ‘‘Big picture conscious’’ individuals, in contrast, are highly
intuitive, preoccupied with gaining an overview of the situation or problem at the expense of detail.
Hence, they run the risk of overlooking vital information. ‘‘Non-discerning’’ individuals deploy min-
imal cognitive resources, being disinclined to process details or extract a bigger picture, relying on the
received wisdom of others, while ‘‘cognitively versatile’’ individuals are predisposed equally to pro-
cessing detail and cutting through such detail to intuit a broader perspective. Cognitive versatility
is the most valued approach for strategic decision making, enabling individuals to blend and flex
to the varying information processing demands, as and when required to do so. Clearly, the typology
offered in Exhibit 6, especially when used in conjunction with appropriate psychometric tools of as-
sessment, provides a useful starting point for fostering self-awareness among those involved in strat-
egizing activity.
Sadler-Smith and Shefy have offered guidelines for the development of intuitive awareness (sum-
marized in Exhibit 7), which have been implemented successfully on MBA programmes.43 More
generally, the extent to which training and development activities designed to encourage managers
to acquire the requisite blend of analytic and intuitive approaches yield tangible improvements in
the strategy-making process, and on what basis they do so, is not yet fully understood. To the extent
that individual differences in the processing of information are relatively stable, trait-likeExhibit 6
Basic typology of contrasting cognitive strategies and styles (Source: G.P. Hodgkinson
and I. Clarke, 2007, ‘Exploring the cognitive significance of organizational strategizing:
A dual-process framework and research agenda,’ Human Relations, 60, 243e255). 2007
by Sage Publications. Reproduced by kind permission of the publisher
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Exhibit 7
Guidelines for developing intuitive awareness (Source: E. Sadler-Smith and E. Shefy,
2004, The intuitive executive: understanding and applying ‘gut feel’ in decision making,
Academy of Management Executive, 18(4), 76e91). 2004 by The Academy of Manage-
ment. Reproduced by kind permission of the publisher
1. Open up the closet To what extent do you: experience intuition; trust your feelings;
count on intuitive judgments; suppress hunches; covertly rely
upon gut feel?
2. Don’t mix up your I’s Instinct, insight, and intuition are not synonymous; practice
distinguishing between your instincts, your insights,
and your intuitions.
3. Elicit good feedback Seek feedback on your intuitive judgments; build confidence
in your gut feel; create a learning environment in which
you can develop better intuitive awareness.
4. Get a feel for your batting average Benchmark your intuitions; get a sense for how reliable your
hunches are; ask yourself how your intuitive judgment
might be improved.
5. Use imagery Use imagery rather than words; literally visualise potential
future scenarios that take your gut feelings into account.
6. Play devil’s advocate Test out intuitive judgments; raise objections to them;
generate counterarguments; probe how robust gut feel
is when challenged.
7. Capture and validate your intuitions Create the inner state to give your intuitive mind the
freedom to roam; capture your creative intuitions;
log them before they are censored by rational analysis.phenomena, there are likely to be upper limits to the attainment of strategic competence through
this route. Moreover, in conditions of severe pressure, it is possible that individuals, albeit well-
trained, may revert to their natural information-processing tendencies. However, we should not
lose sight of the fact that in particular circumstances, the extreme analytic or extreme intuitive
may have competencies that are uniquely suited to solving particular classes of problems or taking
certain types of decisions.44Managing the strategic decision making unit’s composition
An alternative means of enhancing the information processing capabilities of the organization that
might overcome some of the potential limitations of the training and development approach out-
lined above is to adopt selection practices designed to ensure that strategy-making teams are com-
posed in such a way that the requisite blend of analytic and intuitive capabilities are distributed
across the team. Extrapolating from the arguments outlined at the individual level to the team level,
in the case of strategy-making groups dominated by an overly analytical approach, there is a poten-
tial danger of acute information overload and loss of the bigger picture, compounded by the fact
that multiple individuals with a keen eye for detail are pooling information. Conversely, to the ex-
tent the individuals comprising the decision-making unit are marked by an overarching preference
for an intuitive approach to processing information, the principal danger is that decisions will be
made in the absence of a sufficiently comprehensive understanding of the situation. Suitably bal-
anced teams, in contrast, have the potential to function more optimally in terms of processing in-
formation, by virtue of possessing the requisite variety of cognitive styles and strategies. Members of
strategy-making units may be selected in such a way that the unit possesses the requisite mix ofLong Range Planning, vol 42 2009 289
stylistic preferences (analytic and intuitive). Unfortunately, however, as will be discussed in the next
section, balancing the team is not without potential difficulties.
Developing effective leaders for cognitively-diverse strategic decision making units
Attaining the optimal blend of intuitive and analytically-inclined individuals within the strategy-
making unit places a premium on the capabilities of the group’s leader. A key task of the strategic
leader is to effectively manage strategy-making units composed of cognitively-diverse individuals. A
crucial leadership skill is to be able to manage effectively and empathically the dynamics arising
from the diversity of processing strategies and styles at work. In order to minimize the potentially
deleterious impact of such diversity, it is imperative that individuals gain an indepth appreciation of
the relative strengths and limitations of one another’s approaches, so as to foster mutual respect and
trust within the strategy-making unit.45
It is also essential that individuals are given the time and space to raise their natural concerns in
such a way that emotions can be authentically expressed, to the extent required for participants to
bring their underlying differences to a satisfactory resolution, recognising that the strategizing pro-
cess is more than an exercise in thinking; it is both an inherently cognitive and affective process.
Hence a key task of the leader is to allow gut feelings and hunches to surface, in order to enable
debate and the development of shared meaning. In this way, consequent solutions to strategic prob-
lems can be advanced beyond a superficial level, participants owning both the process and associ-
ated outcomes. In the absence of such authentication processes, task and interpersonal conflict are
likely to escalate, undermining the effectiveness of the decision making unit, for as demonstrated by
the work of Michael Kirton and his colleagues, teams composed of individuals with a diverse mix of
cognitive styles do not always make easy bedfellows.46
Intuition and the development of shared meaning
Much work has been devoted to operationalizing how managers’ representations of knowledge
can be mapped and modelled. Intuitions are subjective, experientially rooted judgments (albeit
derived from explicit and implicit learning processes) that arise through rapid, non-conscious ho-
listic associations founded on largely tacit ways of knowing. One implication of this assertion is
that intuitions may challenge or even defy expression by symbolic means, i.e. language. While lan-
guage plays a pivotal role in articulating analytical cognition, it inevitably falls short in attempts to
articulate intuitive and other forms of non-conscious cognition. Nonetheless, decision makers in
the social setting of business organizations must be able to account in some way for their ‘‘gut
feel’’ interpretation of events and their intuitive judgments. As observed by Klein, they may do
this in several ways, including the use of storytelling to connect observed events or by employing
metaphors to provide an analogue or image. The use of stories and metaphors provides a poten-
tially powerful means by which intuitions can be articulated to develop a shared understanding of
the situation.
However, Klein has also pointed out that a potential downside of this approach to surfacing in-
tuitive knowledge for collective consumption is the production of a problematic ‘‘mindset’’ d in
other words, constructing a story to account for an intuition and then using available data to con-
firm it. The story or the metaphor is a translation into symbolic means of an affective state. Con-
sequently, it is not equivalent to the affective state itself, the latter by definition being purely
subjective. Exhortations to individuals to be open-minded to these potential sources of inaccuracy
and bias may be unrealistic. Hence, Klein’s advice is to construct such stories while being prepared
to find flaws in their interpretations, to appreciate one’s fallibility and that of the wider group, and
to acknowledge that intuitions can be wrong, accompanying feelings of certitude notwithstanding.47
Intuition and creative cognition
One area in which the cognitive diversity of strategic decision-making teams is especially signif-
icant in the contemporary business world is in relation to creativity and innovation. In situations
that demand idea generation and divergent thinking, consciously-controlled, logically-justified,290 Intuition in Organizations
Exhibit 8
Lessons for managers
C Acquiring intuitive expertise
- A careful blending of experiential and conceptual/analytical knowledge gained through
years of exposure to challenging problems in the workplace supported by classroom
experience and ‘‘kind learning structures’’.
C Developing self awareness
- Making people aware of their cognitive style, which can range from ‘‘detail conscious
(wholly analytical)" to ‘‘big picture consciousness’’ (wholly intuitive).
C Managing strategic decision making
- Considering making the team a mixture of (competent) people with cognitively diverse
styles of reasoning
- Developing leaders for mixed teams, recognising that teams composed of a diverse mix
do not always make easy bedfellows and can be counterproductive.
- Encouraging those with strong intuition to develop stories to explain their intuition, yet
recognizing that these stories are not ‘‘proofs’’.
C Creative situations
Recognizing that situations that demand creativity also demand intuition, but that this is
not always the same as intuition gained from experience.error-free and ‘‘right first time’’ analytical cognition may not be the best tool. Cognitive strategies
that work well for problems that are well-defined and open to objective decomposition will be
much less effective when the problem is ill-defined and cannot be analysed into objective compo-
nents. The creative cognition required by this latter class of problems is the antithesis of the ac-
cepted view of being ‘‘clever’’ and ‘‘decisive’’: it is ‘‘fuzzy’’, vague, unjustified, experimental,
empathic and slow e a state captured succinctly by the poet Keats through his notion of negative
capability: ‘‘when man is capable of being in Mysteries, Doubts and Uncertainties, without any
irritable reaching after fact and reason’’. Making time available to perceive and think more slowly
makes possible broader cognitions, more abstract thinking and greater flexibility. These cognitions
manifest themselves as ‘‘inklings’’ or ‘‘glimmerings’’ e i.e. intuitions of an understanding not yet
achieved.
The creative cognitions that manifest themselves as intuitions (intimations or feelings of know-
ing) operate at the other end of the speed continuum than that occupied by the lightening-fast ex-
pertise-based judgments that arise in response to the complex, time-pressured situations of the type
studied by NDM and expertise researchers. Allowing for a period of incubation creates space for
mental relaxation and the consequent removal of analytical blocks, for serendipitous associations
to occur and enables the slow spreading of activation trails that may throw up a new metaphor,
perspective or connection that conjoins previously unrelated elements. The intuitive facet of crea-
tivity is not only a complex and ambiguous competency to recognise and assess, it is also difficult to
accommodate within organizational cultures and structures that scorn fallibility and prohibit exper-
imentation, risk taking and departures from efficient standard operating procedures. The creative
cognitions that are one outcome of non-conscious intuitive processes are, like their analytical coun-
terparts, fallible, but nonetheless essential to the generation and exploration of novel ideas in pre-
paring viable alternatives for business success.48Summary and Conclusions
Over recent decades, intuition research has moved increasingly to the fore in the behavioural sci-
ences. Much progress has been made in transforming the notion of intuition from a construct that
was previously consigned to the fringes of the major disciplines in this area to one in which theLong Range Planning, vol 42 2009 291
insights of many of the major branches of psychology and neuroscience have been synthesized into
a compelling theoretical framework. Hence, the rapidly-expanding developments in social cognitive
neuroscience reviewed in this article look set to further substantiate and extend current understand-
ing of intuition, providing vital scientific foundations for its increasing role in organizational life as
well as a framework of lessons for managers (summarized in Exhibit 8).49
More work still needs to be done to establish a firm base upon which to build application-orien-
tated implications for organizations and managers. Further work might include the development of
a more explicit representation of the constructs closely aligned with, yet distinct from, intuition (e.g.
instinct, insight, judgment, creativity, tacit knowledge, implicit learning, wisdom and deep smarts).50
Such clarification should enable deeper and more probing investigations, not only into the condi-
tions under which executives use intuition, but also a clearer picture of the specific circumstances
in which it is likely to be effective. An inevitable consequence of positive developments in this regard
will be the incorporation of intuition into mainstream management education. Researchers and
practitioners can now look forward to a time when the notion of intuition is not only a valid, reliable
and well-theorised construct, with firm empirical foundations, but is also recognised and accepted as
an indispensable element of the competence base of the successful business executive.Acknowledgements
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